Two weeks after the walkie-talkie explosions: Israeli aggression against the Hezbollah terrorist group and Lebanon’s isolation
The walkie-talkie explosions appeared to have been orchestrated the same way as the attack on Tuesday, which was likely carried out by intercepting new pagers at some point in their journey through the supply chain and modifying them to add explosive material. Hezbollah had reportedly expanded its use of pagers recently in an attempt to secure communications after the group feared that other channels had been infiltrated by Israeli intelligence. Reuters reported on Wednesday that Hezbollah purchased the walkie-talkies about five months ago as part of the same initiative that led the group to purchase the pagers.
The official news agency of Lebanon reported that home solar systems exploded less than an hour after the detonations began. The details of the alleged solar equipment assaults were still being developed.
In a statement after Wednesday’s explosions, Lebanon’s Health Ministry said more than 300 people had been injured and nine people had died, with incidents being reported in several regions of the country. The Red Cross of Lebanon said there were more than 30 ambulances involved in the treatment of people injured.
Lebanon’s political landscape and ongoing economic crisis, coupled with regional fighting between Hezbollah and Israel, created specific opportunities for sabotage. Hezbollah is isolated globally, with countries like the United States and United Kingdom classifying it as a terrorist organization while other countries, such as Russia and China, maintain relations. This impacts Hezbollah’s avenues for importing equipment and vetting suppliers.
Identifying the Explosions of Israel’s Walkie-Talkie Devices in the Decay of a Boy Scout in Lebanon
Photos and videos posted to social media appeared to show walkie-talkies in various states of destruction. The larger devices, which are more bulkier than phones, had one side of their shell removed in many images. Cars, scooters, and even buildings seem to have been damaged by tampered devices according to Middle East experts.
In the long term, I believe there is a possibility of more of this in targeting other military actors as well as civilians. Kallenborn says militaries are increasingly relying on commercial technology—from drones to communications devices—all of which could be compromised if supply chains can be exploited by adversaries. He says that the systems are being made in all over the globe. “What that means, then, is that you also have these global supply chains supporting them.”
While full details of the attacks are still coming to light, the devices that detonated were seemingly compromised with explosives before they arrived in Hezbollah members’ hands. Alan Woodward, a cybersecurity professor at the University of Surrey, says he suspects that an attacker would plant explosives in a device during the manufacturing process, rather than intercepting gadgets after they are finished and then taking them apart to plant explosives. The New York Times reported on Wednesday that Israel used shell companies to make the compromised devices. Israel has not commented on the attacks.
Early theories that cyberattacks caused device batteries to overheat and explode have been ruled out by cybersecurity experts. It’s not consistent with the force of the blasts seen on-the-ground footage to see a fire in a pager or walkie-talkie.
This week, the booms rippling across Lebanon came not from Israeli jets streaking across the sky, but from electronic devices exploding in people’s pockets and hands. When Kobeissi asks his family in Lebanon if they’re safe, they tell him that their phones are overheating, and they’re unsure if they’re right to worry.
When Nadim Kobeissi was a child growing up in Beirut in the early 2000s, sonic booms created by the Israel Defense Forces’ planes in the skies above Lebanon would occasionally rattle his home, generating enough noise and concussive force that he and his family would sometimes sleep in the hallways to avoid pieces of glass from shattered windows falling onto them in the night. He believes the psychological effect was intentional. Even years later, after he’d left Lebanon, the sound of fireworks would make him start subconsciously sweating and shaking.
“They’re wondering, is my phone being hacked? Is it going to blow up?” Kobeissi says. “It’s worse than the sonic booms, because it’s completely novel, and it’s almost impossible to explain to them.”
The motives behind the attack are still the subject of much debate, as Israel’s war in Gaza continues with Hezbollah and Hamas threatening each other. But the fact that the explosions were largely carried out by weaponizing communication devices is no coincidence, says Bruce Schneier, a security- and surveillance-focused author and researcher who teaches cybersecurity policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Schneier points out that the psychological effect of the operation, following years of Israeli government and military hacking of its adversaries’ smartphones and computers, is to sow paranoia in every last remaining means of communication and coordination that the country’s enemies possess.